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Labour market institutions and the challenge of allocating the
right people to the right jobs: Evidence on the relation
between labour market institutions and optimal skill
matching from 28 industrial countries
Marie-Christine Fregin, Mark Levels and Rolf van der Velden*
Research Centre for Education and the Labour Market (ROA), University of Maastricht, Maastricht, The
Netherlands
ABSTRACT
This article provides empirical evidence on the relation between
institutional characteristics of labour markets that frame allocation
processes, and optimal skill matching at the individual level. We
investigate the extent to which skill-based job-worker matches are
associated with employment protection legislation (EPL), unem-
ployment benefits, and enforcing and enabling activating labour
market policies. Drawing on data of the OECD’s Programme for the
International Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC), and per-
forming cross-country analyses of 28 industrial countries, we find
that EPL can explain variance in the share of optimal skill matching
across countries, displaying a positive relation. We also find
a negative relation between strict enforcing activating labour mar-
ket policies and optimal skill matching.
KEYWORDS
Skills; mismatch; allocation;
social policy; labour market
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Introduction
Against the background of technological developments and changing demands for skills,
the allocation of the right people to the right jobs and a full usage of talent have become
more important as an issue of scientific but also political and societal concern. During the
last decades many countries engaged in reforms of labour markets and social policies
(Barbieri, Cutuli, and Passaretta 2018; Ochsenfeld 2018), aiming – among other things –
at a better alignment of labour market demands and skills supply. However, suboptimal
matches between workers’ skills and skill requirements of jobs seem to have increased in
number over time (European Commission 2013; Verhaest and van der Velden 2013).
This may be due to imbalances between supply and demand as well as to dynamics in the
demand for skills: technological developments change job requirements so rapidly that
education and training systems are unable to keep pace (Allen and van der Velden 2002).
However, cross-country variation suggests that worker-to-job matches may be related
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with institutions that shape the allocation of workers to job (Levels, van der Velden, and
Di Stasio 2014a; Levels, van der Velden, and Allen 2014b; Green 2013; Van der Velden
and Wolbers 2003). Labour market institutions seem to be of particular theoretical
relevance when it comes to optimal skill matching as they may explain variation in
allocation processes (Barbieri 2009; Gangl 2006, 2004; Estévez-Abe, Iversen, and Soskice
2001; Hall and Soskice 2001). In the literature, there is a common understanding that
employment protection legislation favours established employees (‘labour market insi-
ders’; Lindbeck and Snower 1988), leading to a situation in which particularly young
workers are confronted disproportionally with adverse labour market situations and
related risks (Ochsenfeld 2018; Giesselmann 2014; De Vreyer et al. 2000). The institu-
tional arrangements of labour markets (and especially unemployment benefit schemes)
have been reconfigured during the last decades, particularly during the ‘activation turn’,
a paradigm shift that was accompanied by deregulation and increasing flexibility (Bonoli
2010). Activating labour market policies involve a combination of policies that enforce
labour market participation, and services that promote employability and enable indivi-
duals to find their way into employment (Dingeldey 2007, 823; Gilbert 2002). The
consequences of the ‘activation turn’ are not fully understood yet.
Our study empirically tests the relation between labour market institutions and
optimal skill matching at the individual level. We pose the following research question:
To what extent can the likelihood that workers find a job for which they have the right skills
be explained by characteristics of labour market arrangements?
To answer this question, we analyse data from the OECD’s Programme for the
International Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC). PIAAC is an international
comparative assessment of cognitive and workplace skills of adults aged 16–65. Our
analyses rely on objective skills measurements for employees in 28 industrialised
countries.1 We enrich the PIAAC microdata with measures of social policies at the
country level, more specifically, the degree of employment protection (EPL), unemploy-
ment benefits, and activating labour market policy (ALMP) of labour markets. While we
base our analyses on statistical models for workers of all ages, we put a specific focus on
the situation of young workers, comparing their situation to prime age and older workers
(Ochsenfeld 2018; Fregin 2017; Palier and Thelen 2012; Giesselmann 2014; Lindbeck and
Snower 1988). We do so because young workers form a specific group of workers as they
have to compete for available jobs with those who have already gained experience with
work and employment (e.g. De Vreyer et al. 2000).
Our article advances the literature in two main ways. First, the analyses presented here
are the first to explain the extent to which cross-country variance in optimal skill
matching at the individual level is related to labour market institutions at the country
level. As such, our article is descriptively important. We provide a solid basis for future
analyses of the causal impact of the various policies on worker-to-job skills
matches. Second, our focus on optimal skill matching particularly seeks to advance the
literature on educational matches. The match between workers and jobs is usually
conceptualised by measuring education-to-job matches (e.g. Gangl 2004). Indicators
that are based on detailed information about skills instead of education certificates
provide a better and more dynamic picture of an individual’s human capital and job-
worker matches (e.g. Allen, Levels, and van der Velden, 2013b; Levels, van der Velden,
and Allen 2014b). To contribute to this literature, we examine the relation between
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optimal skill matches and institutional characteristics. We also test institutional features
other than those usually tested, using composite indicators that capture enforcing vs.
enabling activating labour market policies (Knotz 2012).
How are labour market institutions related to optimal skill matching? –
Theory and hypotheses
Previous studies exploring the relation between labour market policies and individual
outcomes seldom look at skill-based job-worker matches (McGowan and Andrews 2015)
but focus, e.g. on employment chances, school-to-work transitions, wages or type of
contract (e.g. Barbieri, Cutuli, and Passaretta 2018; Ochsenfeld 2018; Van der Velden and
Wolbers 2003). Studies that investigate the relation between institutional contexts and
labour market matching mainly focus on education-to-job matches instead of skill
matches (e.g. Levels, van der Velden, and Di Stasio 2014a; Levels, van der Velden, and
Allen 2014b). Besides, the existing literature on skill matching mainly addresses the
impact of education system characteristics, often ignoring labour market policies (e.g.
Heisig and Solga 2014).
By contrast to previous studies, our paper is about ‘optimal skill matching’.
Treating both workers and jobs as a given, this term defines a situation, in which,
in a country, the workers with the highest skills are allocated to the jobs with the
highest skill requirements, and the workers with the lowest skills are allocated to the
low-skilled jobs. From a societal point of view, this would be the most optimal way
of matching workers to jobs. Any disturbance in this rank order leads to suboptimal
matching, where workers are relatively over- or underskilled for their jobs. This
prevents countries from an optimal allocation of the right worker to the right job,
leading to a situation in which the available skills of the available workforce are not
put to optimal use. Hereby, more disturbance means more suboptimal and hence
less optimal matches. Ranking both workers and jobs from low skill (requirements)
to high in a one-dimensional order, the following graph illustrates the idea (for
more information see methods section).
From a societal point of view, social policies, and particularly labour market policies,
should have a role in making sure that countries have an optimal match situation, seeking
to ensure an optimal social outcome. We, therefore, explore how optimal skill matching
relates to institutional factors at the national level. Various aspects of welfare states are
important for explaining optimal skill matching, the most important ones being (i)
employment protection, (ii) unemployment benefits, and (iii) non-financial services
(Schmid 2010). We investigate aspects of all three dimensions.
Employment protection
The degree of employment protection has a major impact on individual labour market
outcomes (Barbieri, Cutuli, and Passaretta 2018). This is especially true for employment
protection legislation (EPL), i.e. legal schemes of procedures and costs involved in worker
dismissals. The ‘overall strictness of EPL continues to vary widely between countries and [. . .]
remains the key element in explaining cross-country differences’ (OECD 2004, 63). The
higher the protection against dismissal, the higher the firing costs even with workers that
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are mismatched and not optimally productive. One could, therefore, hypothesise that the
harder it is to fire someone themore likely it is that mismatched workers remain in their jobs.
However, the regulation of the dismissal process also affects hiring processes. Job security
provisions such as EPL increase hiring risks on the side of the employer. During the allocation
process, employers must anticipate paying dismissal costs, assessing how likely it is that these
risks arise in practice, for example, because a worker turns out to be less productive than
initially expected (Noelke 2011, 4). Dismissal costs would lower the expected returns and
diminish the utility of hiring. Generally, employers tend to be rather risk averse, seeking to
realise expected returns. The higher the costs for dismissals, the more employers will ensure
that their workers match their jobs, which, at the aggregate level, makes a positive relation
between stricter EPL and optimal skill matching more likely than a negative relation. In
countries with a high EPL, we therefore expect that employers try either to find persons that
match their jobs or invest in training for workers that they already hired, as EPL makes re-
allocation costlier for employers. Based on this reasoning, we hypothesise that:
H1.The stricter the degree of employment protection legislation is, the more likely it is that
workers are allocated to jobs that match their skill level, i.e. the higher the share of optimal
skill matching.
As labour market deregulation took part selectively and was directly targeted at labour
market entrants (Ochsenfeld 2018), it is unlikely that EPL affects all age groups in the same
way. By contrast, we would expect that EPL affects young workers stronger than prime age
and older workers. We, therefore, further specify our argument for young workers, devel-
oping additional hypothesis H1a. Restricting our argument to young workers, we capture
moderating effects of employment protection through the introduction of a cross-level
interaction between EPL and young age, hypothesising:
H1a.The stricter the degree of employment protection legislation is, the more likely it is that
particularly young entrants to the labour market are allocated to jobs that match their skill
level, i.e. the higher the share of optimal skill matching.
Unemployment benefits
With reference to globalisation and changing demands for skills, social and labour
market policies have changed the institutional framework of employment towards
a more liberal configuration and de-commodification (Dingeldey 2007, 2011; Gilbert
2002). From a micro-level perspective, the conditioning of social rights reinforced
economic self-reliance and risks (Giesselmann 2014). De-commodification is defined as
welfare state generosity regarding unemployment benefits. More generous unemploy-
ment benefits are theoretically thought to permitting the unemployed more time to find
a job that matches their skills (Estévez-Abe, Iversen, and Soskice 2001). We therefore
hypothesise:
H2.The more generous unemployment benefits are, the more likely it is that workers are
allocated to jobs that match their skills, i.e. the higher the share of optimal skill matching.
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Services and activating labour market policies (ALMPs)
While governments use cutbacks in financial transfers as a straightforward way of
improving the sustainability of social insurance schemes, enabling services such as life-
long training turn out to be a core area of reform programs in many countries. Enabling
policies should increase the share of optimal skill matching, as e.g. unemployed adults are
purposefully (re-)trained to acquire skills that fit labour market demands. A country’s
overall effort in ALMPs finds expression in the amount of public spending for these
policy measures. We test the overall effort in activating labour market policies across
countries (OECD 2013c), hypothesising:
H3.The more countries invest in activating labour market programmes, the more likely it is
that workers are allocated to jobs that match their skills, i.e. the higher the share of optimal
skill matching.
Activating labour market policy programmes include a diverse pool of measures,
ranging from re-skilling and lifelong training to the promotion of atypical, and some-
times even precarious, forms of employment. We expect that diverse measures are
differently related to optimal skill matching; some of them enhancing the chances of
optimal matches, others, by contrast, increasing suboptimal matches and related labour
market risks. We, therefore, take a closer look at the combination of enabling and
enforcing ALMPs, whereby the latter seek to tighten readiness-to-work requirements
and suitability criteria, which usually comes along with cuts in the access to unemploy-
ment benefits (Estévez-Abe, Iversen, and Soskice 2001). As persons are forced into
employment irrespective of the match between the job and the worker, we expect that:
H4a.The more enforcing ALMPs are in effect, the less likely it is that workers are allocated
to jobs that match their skills, i.e. the lower the share of optimal skill matching.
Enforcing policies are usually accompanied by services to assist people on their way
into the labour market. These ‘enabling’ policies include the expansion of training and
upskilling, but also policies facilitating the compatibility of paid and care work and, e.g.
job counselling. As enabling policies are designed to support people to find a job that
matches their skills, we hypothesise:
H4b.The more enabling ALMPs are in effect, the more likely it is that workers are allocated
to jobs that match their skills, i.e. the higher the share of optimal matching.
Data and methods
We use data of the Survey of Adult Skill from the OECD’s Programme for the
International Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC; see OECD 2016a, 2016b).
For PIAAC, representative samples of the workforce aged 16–65 were tested in key skills
related to information processing at work and in daily life. The survey conducted
computer-based assessments in different skill domains such as literacy and numeracy
in many industrial countries. PIAAC provides unique possibilities to investigate optimal
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skill matching as it contains individual level data about cognitive and workplace skills
and a large amount of background information.2 PIAAC deploys a use-oriented, func-
tional skills framework that involves managing a situation or solving a problem in a real
context. For our analyses, we take numeracy skills as proxy for general key information-
processing skills that can be deployed at the workplace at all proficiency levels from very
basic to very complex. The PIAAC numeracy domain captures the general cognitive
ability to grasp meaning and relevant new information which is presented in numerical
sense (OECD 2016a). Previous research has shown that numeracy is the single most
important skill that workers need to have when explaining returns to skills (Levels, van
der Velden, and Allen 2014b).
For our analyses, we draw the following sample selection: As allocation processes
and labour market engagement may be different for part-time workers, we restrict our
working sample to full-time workers (which we define as working 30 h or more per
week).We furthermore restrict our analyses to male workers as the labour market
activity of women, especially of older generations, is much different from that of
men. However, we conduct additional analyses for female workers. We exclude self-
employed, members of the armed forces, unpaid family workers and students/interns
as for these workers the allocation process is different from employees. We further
exclude four PIAAC countries either because data are missing for the country-level
variables (Singapore and Cyprus), data confidentiality issues (Australia) or data quality
issues (Russian Federation). As the Canadian sample is much bigger than the other
countries’ samples, we select a random sample of Canada’s respondents to avoid
overrepresentation in our dataset. Our analyses are thus based on a dataset that
contains representative samples of male full-time working employees for 28 industrial
countries based on microdata for 39,041 individuals (for sample statistics and a full list
of countries, see supplemental material, Tables A1–A3).
Measuring optimal skill matching
Focussing on optimal skill matching in the domain of numeracy, we use an indicator that
captures individual skillmatch asmicro level dependent variable thatwe deploy in all analyses.
In the literature, there is no agreement on how to measure skill matching.3 As PIAAC
measures skill proficiency levels, we focus on the vertical dimension of matches, i.e. optimal
matching at the level of skills, which is different from horizontal field of study matches.
As outlined in the introductory section, we treat both workers’ skills and job skill
requirements as a given and define optimal skill matching (that is perfect allocation) as
a situation, in which the workers with the highest skill levels are allocated to the jobs with
the highest skill requirements and vice versa. To illustrate this, think of the following
example (see Figure 1). Suppose we can rank all workers in a country on the basis of their
skill levels from high to low. And we can also rank all jobs on the basis of their skill
requirements from high to low. An optimal allocation would then be defined as the
situation in which both rank orders correlate perfectly, and the match is thus 100%.
However, this is seldom the case as there are disturbances in this allocation process,
which we here refer to as suboptimal skill matching. We expect the amount of optimal
skill matching to differ between countries as a result of differences in institutional factors
that may disturb the optimal allocation.
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In practice, an optimal allocation cannot be directly observed as we do not have direct
information on the skill requirements of all individual jobs. Instead, we proxy optimal
matching using the so-called Realised Matches Approach (RMA; Van der Velden and
Bijlsma 2018; Flisi et al. 2014, 2016; Perry, Wiederhold, and Ackermann-Piek 2014). The
RMA defines a worker as well-matched if the worker has a skill proficiency level of –
usually – not more than one standard deviation above or below that occupation-specific
level (e.g. Perry, Wiederhold, and Ackermann-Piek 2014). Thereby, the cut-off point of
one standard deviation is chosen as it captures approximately the distance between two
proficiency levels in PIAAC (OECD 2016a, 2016b). We follow this approach, defining
a corridor between one standard deviation above and below the robust-required skill
level of each occupation-country-cell to identify well-matched workers. If the skill level of
a worker lies outside that corridor, we classify the respective worker as mismatched, i.e.
misallocated by level of skill.4 This approach has the attractive feature that the average
worker in an occupation is defined as well-matched, just like we assume in the optimal
skill matching model.
Model specification and micro-level confounders
Our skill match measure is based on the actual skill distribution and the required skill
levels for each ISCO 2-digit occupation in each country. To estimate robust average skill
proficiency levels for each of these occupations, we make use of calculations performed
by Allen and Bijlsma (forthcoming).5 This is necessary because several ISCO groups at
the 2-digit level in PIAAC are very small.6 Allen and Bijlsma (forthcoming) effectively
tackle this problem by computing robust estimates of the average skill level in each
occupation-country-cell. These robust estimates are partly based on information from
other countries than the reference country. This procedure might introduce some bias, as
countries differ regarding the occupational and sectoral structure of their labour markets.
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Figure 1. Illustration of the idea of optimal vs. suboptimal skill matching (Source: own graph).
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We effectively control for this bias by introducing occupational structure (1-digit ISCO
classification) and sector of industry (1-digit ISIC classification) of each country as
controls in all statistical models.
To take into account composition effects wherever applicable, we run all our
models twice, (1) without and (2) with micro-level confounders. Although our
optimal skill matching model should work irrespective of worker characteristics,
certain characteristics typically are a prerequisite to enter certain jobs. That holds
primarily for educational level as minimum educational credentials are often
required to enter a certain occupation. A second prerequisite is often age as some
jobs can only be entered with a certain work experience, e.g. management. Finally,
employers might find it difficult to judge qualification levels and productivity ade-
quately for workers with a migration background as skills may be less observable for
migrants (Seibert and Solga 2005). Countries differ in the composition of the work-
force, which may disturb optimal skill matching. To ensure that the correlations that
we find are not driven by composition effects, we re-run all our main models
including age, age squared (to control for non-linear age effects), migration back-
ground and highest level of education as micro level confounders. In our working
sample, the average age is 40.3 years, with a range from 15 to 65. To operationalise
migration background, we make use of a binary indicator, comparing first-
and second-generation migrants with non-immigrants, finding that 12% of the
workers in our sample have a migration background. The indicator that we use to
operationalise educational attainments defines three levels (measured based on edu-
cational credentials) and differentiates between compulsory education (16% of the
sample), secondary education/apprenticeship (59% of the sample) and tertiary edu-
cation (25% of the sample; for descriptive statistics see Tables A2 and A3 in the
supplemental material).
To test hypothesis H1a, we use a specific model with a cross-level interaction between
EPL and young age. Assessing the robustness of our findings, we re-run our main models
leaving out one country at a time and repeat the main models (EPL and enforcement)
including a random slope at the country level. Furthermore, we compute our main
models separately for young vs. prime age and older workers, private vs. public sector
employees, and for non-immigrants only. We perform additional analyses for full-time
working women.
Measuring labour market policies
We merge institutional characteristics collected in appropriate macro-datasets on the
country level with PIAAC microdata. This combined, hierarchical dataset enables us to
model the macro- and micro-variables simultaneously, testing the hypotheses in multi-
level models (Snijders and Bosker 2012).
The information on the macro level originates from different sources. Most macro
level indicators that we use describe the situation in the year in which the PIAAC survey
was conducted. PIAAC ran from 2011–2014. For each country, we use macro data from
the year in which PIAAC was conducted in the respective country. Only the indicators
for enforcement and enablement (Knotz 2012) display the situation in the mid-2000s, as
this is the only point in time available.
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To capture labour market institutions, we make use of several indicators that are
commonly used in this type of research. We use an index for employment protection
legislation (EPL) for permanent contracts as proxy for the degree of regulation
(OECD 2018). This indicator as provided by the OECD (2018) is the weighted
sum of sub-indicators concerning the regulations for individual dismissals (weight
of 5/7) and additional provisions for collective dismissals (2/7). It incorporates 13
detailed data items. The indicator is available for all 28 countries in our analyses, and
has a range from 1 to 3, with a mean of 2.3 with a standard deviation of 0.5.
Regarding unemployment benefits we use the state-of-the-art indicator for average net
replacement rates during the first 5 years of unemployment as percentage of previous net
income (OECD 2013c). The indicator captures the average net replacement rate over 60
months following unemployment for a one-earner couple with two children, where the
earner previously earned the average wage (OECD 2013c). This indicator is available for
all our 28 countries. It has a range from 9 (min) to 83 (max), a mean of 57 with a standard
deviation of 18.
The information on public expenditure on active labour market policies is also provided by
theOECD(2013a). It captures the total amount of public spending as percentage ofGDP.7 For
this indicator, the latest data is available for 2011 and it is only available for 23 countries. The
indicator has a range of 0 to 2.3, a mean of 0.7 with a standard deviation of 0.6.
The indicators that we use to operationalise enforcement and enablement stem
from Knotz (2012). Inspired by Esping-Andersen’s (1990) decommodification index,
Knotz (2012) provides composite indicators that quantify the mix of enforcing and
enabling measures that characterises ALMP schemes in an international comparison.
The author constructs two composite indices, quantifying the strengths of enabling
versus enforcing policies across countries (for details see Knotz 2012). The data display
the situation in 17 PIAAC-countries. The unique composite indicators quantify
activation strategies, which are defined as configurations of ALMPs, passive benefit
systems, and all related policies (e.g. family and tax policies). The author combines
financial and non-financial policy measures for both enforcement and enablement and
combines them into composite indicators, quantifying ALMPs that are designed to
activate unemployed and inactive persons to search for and take up employment
(Knotz 2012: 12 et seq.). Enforcement has a min of 0.5 and a max of 0.8, with
a mean of 0.6 and a standard deviation of 0.01. Enablement has a slightly larger
range of 0.2 to 0.65, with a mean of 0.4 and a standard deviation of 0.1. We use the
indicators provided by Knotz (2012) in addition to the above mentioned, commonly
used measures, as they allow us to capture a more detailed picture of ALMP schemes
across countries.8
Analyses
We start our analyses with descriptive results on the cross-country univariate distribu-
tion of skill matching. Thereafter, we perform the above outlined multilevel analyses to
explore the relation between labour market institutions and optimal skill matching.
Thereafter, we provide the results of robustness checks, including analyses for different
subgroups of workers.
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We estimate multilevel mixed-effects logit regression models (using the melogit-
command in Stata 15). Defining πij = Pr(matchij= 1), we use the following Equation (1):
logitðπijÞ ¼ Ajβþ Bijγ þXijδ
 þ uj þ ij (1)
for j= 1; . . . ; 28 countries, with i= 1; . . . ; nj fulltime working male employees in countries
j. Aj is a vector that contains country-level variables, i.e. the characteristics of labour
market policies that we described in the theoretical section. The vector Bij contains
a constant as well as ISCO-1 digit and ISIC-sector dummies, which we use as basic
controls on the individual level in all our statistical models. Xij is the vector containing
our micro-level characteristics that we include when we repeat our models. If not stated
differently in the tables, the vector includes age, age squared, educational attainment, and
migration background. All our main analyses are based on Equation (1). Only for the
analysis referring to Hypothesis H1a we extend Xij adding a fixed effect of a dummy
indicating young worker, a cross-level interaction with EPL, and a random slope at the
country level. The errors ij are assumed to be distributed as logistic with mean 0 and
variance π2/3 and are assumed to be independent of country random effects uj.
All analyses are weighted using a ‘rescaling to cluster size’ approach, with which we
account for different sample-sizes between countries by adjusting the overall sample
weight in PIAAC. To evaluate the goodness of fit of our statistical models, we conduct
deviance tests (Snijders and Bosker 2012, 97).
Results
We start our empirical analyses assessing the amount of optimal vs. suboptimal skill
matching across countries. As outlined above, we restrict our main analyses to male
fulltime working employees. Figure 2 displays the proportions of workers in our sample
who have skills that match their jobs across countries compared to the percentages of
over- and underskilling.
The proportion of optimal skill matching varies between 67% (in Israel) and 85%
(Slovak Republic). On average, around 76% of the male full-time working employees are
well matched on the basis of their skills, although considerable differences exist between
countries. Furthermore, we find considerable amounts of suboptimal matching, with
Figure 2. Proportion of skill matching and skill mismatches over countries (Male full-time workers).
Source: Pooled PIAAC-data; own calculations.
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around 11% of our working sample being underskilled, and around 13% being
overskilled.
We now turn to the multilevel analyses, starting with results for the whole sample of
male full-time working employees as presented in Table 1. For each model, skill matching
at the micro-level is the dependent variable under study. If not stated differently, all tables
display average marginal effects (AME). Note that ISCO 1-digit and ISIC 1-digit are
included as controls in all models.
Model 1 estimates the relation between EPL and the likelihood of optimal matching at
the individual level. The AME is positive and highly significant, which means that
a stricter degree of EPL is related with a higher share of optimal skill matching, just as
we expected based on hypothesis H1. Thereby, the positive relation between EPL and
optimal matching is almost as big as the negative association with migration background.
As with all models, we re-run the analyses including micro-level confounders (Model 1a),
showing that our findings hold even if we control for composition effects. Models 2 and 3
display our findings for unemployment benefits (H3) and public expenditure on active
labour market policy (H4). We do not find empirical support for these hypotheses as the
obtained AMEs are very small (or even 0 in the case of unemployment protection) and
statistically not significant.9 This holds if we include micro-level confounders, which is
why we refute both H3 and H4. Based on these analyses, particularly EPL seems to be
related to optimal skill matching.
As outlined in the theoretical section, we make use of composite policy indicators
measuring the combination of enforcement and enablement, which are only available for
17 countries (Knotz 2012). We do not want our estimates to be different just because we
have to rely on a different sample of countries when testing hypotheses H4a and H4b. We,
therefore, test EPL on the limited sample of countries for which the indicators provided by
Knotz (2012) are available. Models 4 and 4a show that our results are still valid.
Based on the reduced sample of 17 countries, Models 5 and 6 test the composite
indicators for enforcement and enablement. For enforcement (H4a) we find what the
theory predicts: strict enforcement of labour market participation shows a relatively big
and statistically significant negative association with optimal skill matching. Although
part of the variance can be explained by micro-level confounders (see Model 4a), this
effect is more than twice as big as the negative association with migration background.
Testing enablement (H4b) in Model 6, we find only a weak and statistically barely
significant positive relation between enablement and skill matching, which even disap-
pears when we include micro-level confounders, controlling for composition effects, and
refute H4b.
To scrutinise our main findings, we take the two most important macro-level indica-
tors ─ EPL and enforcement ─ both up in a joint model (Model 7), finding that the AME
of EPL is reduced in size, but still highly significant, while the relation between enforce-
ment and optimal skill matching disappears. Assessing the goodness of fit of our (logit)
models using likelihood ratio tests, we show that the decrease in deviance is statistically
highly significant for all models. Our intermediate conclusion is that EPL is a strong
indicator with a positive and highly significant relation to optimal skill matching, while
the composite indicators for enforcement and enablement are found to be weak.
With Table 2, we specify further analyses for EPL, testing our additional hypothesis
H1a. Is the relation between EPL and skill matching different for young (age<35)
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compared to adult (age≥35) workers? To answer this question, we include a cross-level
interaction between EPL, a dummy indicating young worker, and test a random slope at
the country level.
Table 2 shows that the cross-level interaction between EPL and young worker is not
significant, which means that EPL does not only affect optimal skill matching of young
workers but also prime age and older workers. We also tested a random slope on the
country level which only has a very small effect. These results hold if we control for
micro-level confounders.
Robustness
Before we outline the main results of our robustness checks, note that full results of all
tests can be found in the supplemental material. As a first robustness check for our main
analyses presented in Table 1, we analyse whether our results are driven by single
countries, re-running the analyses for EPL and enforcement with n-1 countries.
Table 2. Testing Hypothesis 1a: Is the relation between EPL and skill matching different for young
(age<35) compared to adult (age≥35) workers? (Male full-time working employees).
Model 1 Model 1a
VARIABLES Wellskilled Wellskilled
Fixed effects
EPL 0.273*** 0.239***
(0.074) (0.072)
Young worker (Dummy = 1)a 0.044 0.013
(0.164) (0.173)
EPL*young worker (CLI) −0.004 0.008
(0.066) (0.069)
Migration Background −0.280***
(0.068)
Secondary/Apprentice Ed. 0.351***
(0.072)
Tertiary Education −0.035
(0.082)
Random effects variance
Country 0.043 0.037
(0.013) (0.011)
Observations 38,180 37,977
Number of countries 28 28
Likelihood ratio test Model 1 Model 1a
GOODNESS OF FIT of the models
log likelihood −21778 −21521
Devianceb (Di) 43556 43042
Deviance decrease (D0-Di)
c 130 390
Degrees of freedom (df = 4) (df = 7)
Chi-squared value p < 0.005
***
p < 0.005
***
LOG ODDS based on multilevel mixed-effects logistic regression models; Figures are weighted;
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1;
Robust standard errors in parentheses; CONTROLS INCLUDE OCCUPATIONAL STRUCTURE (ISCO1) AND SECTORAL
STRUCTURE (ISIC1)
aWe tested a random slope at the country level, which only has an insignificantly small effect
bDeviance = −2*(log likelihood), see Snijders and Bosker (2012, 12);
cThe decrease in deviance is computed based on the specific intercept of each model (D0).
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For EPL, we find that the relation with optimal skill matching is robust and valid for all
countries (Table A5). Only when we include the micro-level confounders the association
decreases a little if we leave out the US-American data but stays significant at the 5%-
level. The US have a lower amount of skill matching combined with a low EPL that makes
dismissals less costly. Based on this, we find that the US have higher share of suboptimal
matches than we would have expected based on EPL. Repeating this robustness check for
enforcement (Table A6), we find that the observed associations here are partly driven by
Canada and the US. These two countries score high on enforcement and low on optimal
skill matching at the same time. We conclude that the negative relation between enfor-
cing policies and optimal skill matching is particularly evident for very high values of
enforcement. Generally, this robustness check still supports our theoretical arguing
outlined in hypothesis H4a: If high levels of strict enforcing ALMPs are in place, the
likelihood that workers are allocated to jobs that do match their skills is reduced. Next, we
repeat the analyses (1) without and (2) micro-level confounders for EPL and enforce-
ment, using a random slope at the country level (Table A7). This test shows that our
estimates are not sensitive to this model specification: While the average marginal effects
of both EPL and enforcement are reduced in size, significance and sign of the indicators
proof to be robust.
To take into account the fact that institutions may not explain variance in outcomes of
all groups of workers in the same way, and to further scrutinise the results for hypothesis
H1a (displayed in Table 2), we repeat our models separately for young (age<35) and
prime age/older (age≥35) male full-time workers (Table A8a+b). We find that the
indicator for EPL does not change much in size. However, once we include micro-level
confounders, it is only statistically significant at the 5%-level. For the reduced sample of
young workers, we also find that the estimates for both Knotz-indicators for enforcement
and enablement disappear. This could also be due to the large reduction both in number
of countries and number of individuals. We repeat these analyses for prime age and older
workers (age≥35). Here, the results are largely comparable to Table 1, the results for EPL
and enforcement are robust if we only look at adult workers, while enablement now
displays a positive relation that is significant at the 5%-level. This is also the case when we
repeat the analyses for non-immigrant workers only, excluding respondents with
a migration background (Table A9). Again, the results for EPL and enforcement are
robust, while enablement is positive and significant at the 5%-level. For non-immigrants,
unemployment protection is also slightly significant, but the association disappears when
we control for composition effects.
We furthermore address differences between the public and private sector, running
the above-outlined models separately for male full-time working employees in the public
sector and in the private sector (Table A10a+b). We find that all results hold for the
private sector, but not for the public sector for which we hardly find any significant
correlations that can explain variance. This is an interesting result in itself and in line
with theoretical reasoning. We would expect institutions like EPL to explain more
variation in the private sector than in the public sector, as public sectors are highly
regulated in all countries and therefore more similar across countries than private
sectors.
Last we perform additional analyses, running our main models for female full-time
workers (Table A11). The results for women differ from those for men. For women, EPL
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loses explanatory power, when we include micro-level confounders as well as when we
additionally control for enforcement; Unemployment protection is statistically highly sig-
nificant, although the AME is very small; enforcement displays a statistically significant and
negative relation with optimal skill matching, and – other than for men – have a positive
relation that is significant at the 10%-level and robust if we control for composition effects.
However, further insights would require a systematic comparison between men and women.
Discussion and conclusion
According to recent studies, skill mismatches are a ‘pervasive’ (Cedefop 2010) and ‘persis-
tent’ phenomenon, implying that the incidence is also related to labourmarket arrangements
(Flisi et al. 2016, 2). Against this background, the issue of optimal job-worker matching has
gained importance as a topic of scientific, but also political and social relevance. Our analyses
contribute to fill in a gap in existing literature by providing empirical evidence for the
association between labour market policies and optimal skill matching, and by disentangling
different shades of activating labour market policies that characterise todays’ social policy
mix of industrialised societies, examining their relation with optimal skill matching. We seek
to outline the most important findings as well as related policy implications.
First and foremost, we provide empirical evidence that a higher employment protec-
tion legislation (EPL) is associated with higher shares of optimal skill matching: The
stricter the degree of EPL, the more likely it is that workers are allocated to jobs that
match their skill level. This is a strong and very robust finding that holds even if we
control for compositional effects of the workforce, run the analysis on a reduced sample
of countries, or look at subgroups of workers. Furthermore, we find that EPL does not
only explain variation in skill matches for young entrants to the labour market but both
adult and young workers in the same way. One explanation may be that a stricter EPL
increases employer’s awareness that skills must fit with the requirements. The underlying
mechanism of the association that we find is either in a more careful selection of workers
into jobs or in lifelong learning: Keeping workers’ skills matched with jobs over the years
is related to providing opportunities for learning on the job. Our results provide first
indications that employers may be more selective in the process of hiring, but this could
go hand in hand with more emphasis on training on the job. A robustness check also
suggests that the lack of EPL can explain cross-country variation in optimal skill match-
ing through firing decisions. The US is a country that combines a low level of optimal
matching with a low EPL. The results open up a promising research area that should be
further explore in future studies.
Our second major finding is that strict enforcing ALMPs are related to lower shares of
optimal skill matching and thus higher shares of skill mismatch. Using composite policy
indicators that capture the qualitative mix of enforcing and enabling policies, we find
that: the more enforcing ALMP’s are in effect, the less likely it is that workers are
allocated optimally regarding their skill level. While the evidence merely holds for
countries with strict enforcing policies, our findings provide first hints that strict enfor-
cement does not lead countries in the right direction when it comes to facing the
challenge of allocating the right people to the right jobs.
The additional analyses that we perform for full-time working women as compared to
men provide some interesting while preliminary results as they outline major differences
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between men and women concerning labour market institutions and their relation with
optimal skill matching. Activating labour market policies have been particularly designed to
activate social groups that have formerly been largely inactive (such as women andmothers).
The analyses presented here provide first indications that this is also relevant for optimal skill
matching. Further research could address selective policy effects, analysing the relation with
different social policies, e.g. including family policies. While all analyses presented here are
descriptively important, they provide a first step towards a thorough investigation of the
causal effects of labour market institutions on skill matching at the individual level.
Notes
1. A full list of countries is entailed in Table A1 in the supplemental material.
2. For more detailed information about the PIAAC dataset and technical issues see OECD
(2013b, 2016).
3. We include a description of the debate and the commonly used measures in the supple-
mental material.
4. We compute the standard deviation of the 10 plausible values of the individual numeracy
scores in PIAAC, pooling over ISCO 2-digit categories. We use the repest-command in Stata
15 to properly take into account the PIAAC replicate weights.
5. Van der Velden and Bijlsma (2018) show that the total explained variance does not change if
they use 3-digit instead of 2-digit ISCO categories.
6. We could have simply computed the simple mean per country but then we would have lost
many occupations (see Pellizzari and Fichen 2013). Instead, we decided to just exclude the
very small occupation-country-cells with less than 25 observations.
7. As a robustness check, we make use an alternative indicator that captures the total spending
on ALMP per unemployed workers as percentage of GDP per capita, which is provided by
the OECD Employment and Labour Market Statistics database 2016.
8. Country scores on all macro-level indicators are displayed in the supplemental materials.
9. As a robustness check, we re-ran Model 3 using an alternative indicator for public spending
per unemployed worker as percentage of GDP per capita (OECD 2016). This indicator, too,
does give AMEs close to 0 that are statistically not significant (see Table A4 in the supple-
mental material).
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